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THE RISE, THE FALL, AND THE RESURRECTION OF THE eGROCERY CHANNEL:
A TRANSFORMATION IN RETAIL LOGISTICS AND U.S. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
M. Theodore Farris II
Janeth Gabaldon
University of North Texas
ABSTRACT
Nearly 20 years ago this journal published “Where Have All The On-Line Grocers Gone?” about the
growing online grocery market and correctly predicted that the concept would fail until logistics issues were
resolved. This article considers the changes that have taken place since then and why there has been a
resurrection and exponential growth in the eGrocery channel. It considers how the forced disruption from
the COVID-19 virus has served to help further the development and growth of this channel.
EVOLUTION OF THE GROCERY
INDUSTRY
More than ten decades have passed since the first
modern American supermarket opened doors. In
1916, Piggly Wiggly supermarket pioneered a selfservice model that redesigned food shopping
strategies (Piggly Wiggly, 2011). Prior to that,
customers would give the store clerk a list, and the
clerk would personally pick out the groceries from
the shelves, place them into bags and give them
back to the customer (Ross, 2016).
The introduction of the shopping cart in 1936 shifted
fulfillment away from the store clerk and placed
fulfillment responsibility directly on the customer.
This transformation allowed multiple customers to
roam freely throughout the store and pick their own
groceries from the shelves and collect them in a
shopping cart. It required an extensive physical
redistribution and reconfiguration of the stores to
increase customer capacity, and lower costs, but it
increased sales (Wilson, 1978). Previously, grocers
considered consumption as a manner of “grocery
hydraulics” rather than a matter of consumer
psychology (Cochoy, 2009).
In the 1990’s retailers began experimenting with the
concept of online retailing, where goods would be
shipped from central distribution centers directly to
the consumer. This later evolved in some cases into
e-shopping where the consumer would pick up their

order at the store. However, by the early 2000’s the
online concept had largely failed. The authors of
“Where Have All the On-Line Grocers Gone?
Lessons Learned from the Demise of On-Line
Grocers” (Farris and Wilson, 2002) investigated the
online grocery market structure and concluded that
the logistical elements made the concept cost
prohibitive. In a thriving dot.com environment,
startups had been flush with venture capital that
covered inefficiencies and cost deficits in the short
run. The industry did not evolve the model, and the
concept failed when the start-ups burned through
their cash. Rapid expansion, substantial investments
in warehouses, high costs in operations, and costly
transportation models were the principal reasons for
ceasing operations for many early online grocers. A
recent report shown in Table 1 points out that
compared to other retail the grocery industry had
fallen behind in modernization and application of
technology. It also recognizes that the grocery
industry has made significant improvements in recent
years.
Smart shopping carts now offer checkout-free
shopping with a built-in technology to automatically
scan and charge the customer’s item once it is
placed into the cart. Artificial intelligence systems
1

Throughout this paper, we use the term “eGrocery”
to represent a channel that has developed supporting
the overall grocery industry and recognizing that
some sales figures include products that may be sold
exclusively online and are not available in grocery
stores.
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tally customer purchases and post the results
directly on the customer’s phone via a mobile app
(Boyle, 2019). For example, Amazon Go operates
more than 20 cashier-less supermarkets where the
customer uses an app to enter the store, take the
products, and exit without human interaction
checking out, all powered by computer vision and
machine learning (Amazon, 2019).

labor-savings. Early studies pointed to development
of the eGrocery channel as a means of improving
the life of grocery consumers.

Prior to COVID-19, Statista pre-COVID-19
projected potential eGrocery sales of $41.31 billion
by 2021 and $59.3 billion by 2023 (Conway,
2020). Since this projection, the forced disruption
from COVID-19 has served to further the
development of eGrocery channels. Shakespeare
penned the phrase “the past is prologue.” We have
learned from the past mistakes of the eGrocery
channels from decades past in order to improve the
eGrocery channel approach today and going
forward.

• According to the Food Marketing Institute, the
average American household made 2.3 trips to the
grocery store a week and spent $87 per week on
groceries (Richards, 1996).

EARLY eGROCERY FAILURES
Ordering groceries on the internet was initially
expected to be a very promising opportunity to
lower costs and increase revenue in an industry
which typically has had only 1% to 3% profit
margin. For customers, it was considered (and still
is) a suitable option adding convenience, time, and
74
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• A survey by the University of Michigan ranked 22
favorite household tasks and found that grocery
shopping came in next-to-last, just ahead of cleaning
(Henry, 2000).

• The average grocery trip took an estimated 47
minutes, not including time to drive, park and unload
groceries (Linstedt, 1998).

Consider the difficult operating environment for the
eGrocery industry:
• relatively low order value
• extremely low profit margins per item
• short product life
• compressed delivery windows
• restrictions on customer availability
• customized customer orders
• highly competitive market
• specialized costs in storage and transportation

While customers recognized and valued a home
delivery system, many eGrocers could not compete
with traditional bricks- and-mortar grocery retailers
(Kämäräinen, et al., 2001). There were a number of
failures due to excessive costs and misguided
priorities due to irrational exuberance.
Early participants including Streamline,
HomeGrocer, and Webvan ended operations, filed
for bankruptcy, or were sold to competitors. Table
2 identifies the companies competing in the
eGrocery channel in 2001. Many are still
recognizable as thriving bricks-and-mortar retailers
but exited the eGrocery channel.
Streamline started operations in November 1996 as
a service providing home delivery groceries, movie
rental, dry cleaning, and film. It delivered groceries
on a weekly schedule from its own warehouses and
put them away at the customer’s property for a $30
monthly flat fee (Borrego, 2001). Shortly after a
1999 IPO, Streamline ceased operations and
discontinued service in November, 2000 due to
extremely high expenses to maintain their business
model (WSJ, 2000).
HomeGrocer provided next-day delivery of fresh
produce, seafood, and meat to more than seven
U.S. states (CNN, 2000a). Online orders under
$75 were charged a $10 delivery fee, while orders
above $75 had no delivery charge (Fisher and
Kotha, 2014). HomeGrocer developed all of its
own technology including an award-winning
website, wireless picking systems that used Wi-Fi,

and a driver smart phone application, years before
they were mainstream. Facilities were opened in
Oregon, Washington, California, and Texas. Each
100,000 square foot facility operated 7 days a
week with 50 delivery vehicles and a staff of 200.
By June, 2000 daily sales exceeded $1 million per
day. Construction started on 16 additional facilities
in Georgia, Illinois, Washington, DC, and Colorado
(Fisher and Kotha, 2014). In spite of raising $288
million with an IPO it was not enough to continue
operations. In September, 2000 stockholders
approved a $1.2 billion all-stock sale to Webvan
(Sandoval, 2002). After the sale, the brand’s sales
peaked in November, 2000 at $1.5 million daily.
Amazon eventually bought the brand in 2002 for
$42.5 million (c|net, 2002).
Webvan initially started developing their concept in
1997. Under their model, customers would order
online and specify a delivery time. Groceries were
delivered to the customer the next day within a 30minute window (Aspray, et al., 2013a). Investors
pressured the company for very fast growth in order
to capture first-mover advantage. Webvan
responded by placing a $1 billion order with Bechtel
to build warehouses and bought a fleet of delivery
trucks (Wolverton, 2001). This rapid growth has
been cited as one of the reasons for the failure of the
company. Webvan started taking orders in the San
Francisco Bay Area in June 1999. By 2000, it had
$178.5 million in annual sales but $525.4 million in
annual expenses, servicing 10 U.S. cities and hoping
to expand to 26 cities by 2001 (CNN, 2001;
Goldman, 2015). Venture capitalists invested more
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than $396 million and the company raised an
additional $375 million in an IPO which valued the
company at more than $4.8 billion (Richtel, 1999).
Up to the time of the IPO, the company had
reported cumulative revenue of $395,000 and
cumulative net losses of more than $50 million
(SEC, 1999) and had spent between 25% and 35%
of its revenue on advertising (compared with about
1% for traditional grocery chains). It filed
bankruptcy in June 2001 losing $830 million
(Delgado, 2001).
Key reasons contributing to Webvan’s failure
include:
• Excessive initial fixed cost investments of $35
million for each warehouse (Hays, et al., 2005)
• High operating costs of $125 million per quarter
(Aspray, et al., 2013a).
• Not effectively utilizing capacity. Their warehouses
averaged 350,000 square feet each, the equivalent
to 18 average grocery stores, and were running at
one-third capacity (Aspray, et al., 2013b)
• High cost of customer acquisition and retention.
The company invested $210 to acquire a new
customer while achieving less than a 50% customer
return rate (Aspray, et al., 2013b).

computer to place a grocery order and would then
fulfill the groceries from Jewel stores and deliver
them to the customer (Dalke, 2017).
Unlike other eGrocers, Peapod worked in
partnership with local groceries. Peapod pioneered
many of the online grocery ordering tools that are
commonplace today, such as being able to sort by
price, description, and size. It was the first grocer to
use digital coupons, personalized specials, and allow
shoppers to create online lists. It was the first
company to have software that recalled past order
history so the customer could easily reorder items in
the future (Dalke, 2017).
By 2017, Peapod was in 24 markets, mostly in the
Midwest and Northeast, with more than 2,000 fulltime employees along with over 350 part-time
workers and 600 product selectors (Dalke, 2017).
After Royal Ahold bought Peapod, they cancelled
their contracts with all grocery companies except for
Royal Ahold’s two main American chains - Stop &
Shop and Giant Food - (PYMNTS, 2017) and
February 2020, announced they would be ceasing
operations in the Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, and
Wisconsin) and focus exclusively on serving the East
Coast markets (Elejalde-Ruiz, 2020).

Many early online grocery retailers, such as
Webvan, Netgrocer, and Peapod were considered
e-tailers or pure-play companies because they
would only sell over the internet and fulfilled out of
warehouses. This was a “click” strategy and
companies found it difficult to provide comparable
customer service to that offered by conventional
retailers using a “brick strategy.” Since the early
failures, many grocers have adopted a “bricks-andclick, also known as online-plus-physical-stores,
strategy” (Lim, et al., 2001).

It is estimated in 2018 that people spent an average
of $121for Peapod orders, compared to $72 at
Walmart Pickup Grocery and $60 with
AmazonFresh in 2018. Peapod had a 93%
satisfaction rating. 40% of Peapod’s shoppers were
millennials compared to 25% of people who visited
Ahold bricks-and-mortar store — making the food
delivery company a key way for Ahold to expand its
customer base (Doering, 2018).

Not all the eGrocery businesses failed. Peapod
started in 1989 and introduced online grocery
features such as personalized specials, digital
coupons, and online lists early in its business model
with a delivery fee of $6 and two-hour delivery
windows. It required customers to physically
download software from CD-ROMs onto their

There were initially two types of fulfillment models;
dedicated fulfillment centers (DFC) and in-store
fulfillment centers (SFC):
• Dedicated Fulfillment Centers (DFC): Used by
Streamline, Homerun, WebVan, and GroceryWorks
to process orders, this model is a warehouse/depot
model which takes the retail store out of the cost
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EARLY FULFILLMENT MODELS

structure by delivering directly from the warehouse.
It consolidates delivery of multiple product classes
as well as services to the home, with a lower cost
structure (Casper, 1998). Streamline offered an
innovative, but labor intensive approach to using this
model. A setup team was dispatched to a
customer’s house where the contents of the kitchen
were scanned to create a personal shopping list
which typically accounted for 70% to 75% of a
family’s weekly order. The family was given a UPC
code list as its core shopping list, plus another list of
the products and services available through
Streamline including video rentals, dry cleaning, and
bottled water. To order, family members checked
off from their core list and the additional services list
to identify their weekly needs. As long as the order
was placed by midnight, delivery would take place
by 6 p.m. the next day. Customers received a
combination refrigerator, freezer/dry storage cabinet
measuring 5 feet wide by 5 feet high by 2 feet deep
which was placed in their garage. Streamline
operated a fleet of trucks with three different
temperature zones to maintain the integrity of the
products and made weekly deliveries to the box.
Streamline customers paid a box installation charge
of $39 and a monthly fee of $30 (Matthew 1999).
The average Streamline customer ordered goods 47
times per year and spent an average of $5,200 per
year. Box installation and monthly fees accounted
for 7.7% of the annual expenditure by the customer
(Liebeck, 1997a).
• In-store Fulfillment Centers (SFC): Used by
Peapod and Tesco this model tapped into the
existing logistics infrastructure, utilizing retail stores
for fulfillment. Peapod bridged the gap between
store and home and charged for the service
(Casper, 1998). In its early days as a Chicago-area
start-up, Peapod fulfilled orders by picking items
from the shelf of a local Jewel grocery chain. Their
delivery costs averaged about $12 per order. A
typical Peapod customer would spend $120 per
order (Lindsay, 1999) and was charged a $4.95 flat
monthly fee per order and 5% of the total order.
The additional cost per order averaged $13.42 or
about 11.2% (Leibs, 1997).

THE RESURRECTED eGROCERY
CHANNEL
The eGrocery channel concept has continued to
evolve and capture an increasing share of the
grocery market. In 2018 a study suggested 42% of
people would rather be stuck in rush hour traffic in
Manhattan than not be able to do their shopping
online (DHL, 2018). The forced disruption from
COVID-19 may be enough of an incentive to force
eGrocery channels to mature and become
embedded into consumer purchasing behavior.
Between 2016 and 2018 the eGrocery channel
doubled in size. (Magana, 2019) Pre-COVID-19
projections, close to the estimates cited for
Statistica, suggested by 2021, U.S. eGrocery sales
could reach $38.16 billion and be as high $59.5
billion by 2023. In spite of the market share growth
in the U.S., it pales in comparison to growth
elsewhere in the world, as shown in Table 3. China
is the biggest digital grocery player in the world,
with eGrocery revenues expected to nearly
quadruple by 2023. (Kats, 2019).
Table 4 shows that nearly one-third of digital
grocery shoppers in the Netherlands, the U.K.,
Germany and France had groceries delivered at
least weekly in 2018. Pre-COVID-19, Capgemini
projected by 2021 more than half of respondents in
the Netherlands, U.K. and Germany will have
groceries delivered once per week (Kats, 2019).
Domestically, eGrocery shopping in the United
States continues to grow. Table 5 suggests that prior
to COVID-19 U.S. shoppers were gradually
adopting and using the concept with a sizable
increase in 2019.
Contrast the 2001 list of eGrocers in business
shown in Table 2, with the list in Table 6 which
reflects eGrocery market share in 2019. By 2019
three competitors, Amazon, Walmart, and Target
held 81% of the market (Droesch, 2020).
Table 7 offers a slightly different perspective
reflecting growth from 2018 to 2019. This may be
Vol. 30 No. 2
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due to a different definition of what constitutes the
term “groceries” or represents ownership in a
different manner. For example, Ahold owns
Peapod.
Amazon’s 2018 sales increase has been fueled by
their evolving omnichannel grocery strategy. In May,
2018, Amazon expanded its same-day Whole
Foods delivery service into 88 U.S. markets and
plans to open thousands of Amazon Go stores by
2021. Walmart’s sales growth has been fueled by
Walmart’s large brick-and-mortar footprint which
gives them the opportunity to develop curbside
pickup capabilities. 76% of U.S. shoppers prefer
Walmart’s curbside pickup to 14% who prefer to

shop in-store. Kroger saw the biggest year-to-year
gain of 66% by expanding home delivery capability
to 91% of available households and making grocery
pickup available at 1,581 of its 2,764 stores (Koch,
2019).
FOCUSING GROWTH IN URBAN
MARKETS
Markets with a denser concentration of customers
and shorter travel distances to the customer make
the most economic sense for growing eGrocery
channels. Table 8 identifies the share of the
eGrocery market in top metropolitan areas and is
sorted by population.
Vol. 30 No. 2
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eGROCERY LOYALTY
eGrocery shoppers are loyal. Most Americans
regularly shop at just one or two grocery stores, so
it is not surprising that most online grocery shoppers
also stick with their favorite service (Rieck, 2019).
Once a customer tries shopping with an eGrocery
channel and decides to continue using the channel,
they typically continue to use that provider and do
not readily switch to another provider (Rafiq and
Fulford, 2005). This is in contrast to the meal
delivery industry, where diners frequently hop
between apps to get the broadest selection of
restaurants. As the eGrocery market increases,
capturing market share will come from obtaining
new customers to the concept instead of luring them
from the eGrocery competition. Table 9 reflects that
the highest potential conversions in 2019 came to
Instacart who provided service to 5% to 13% of
customers using other services.
While initially online shopping was viewed as a
separate channel to sell groceries, many retailers
have realized the need to add online channels to
existing traditional distribution channels to provide a
customer-oriented multichannel experience and
keep their market share (Herhausen, et al., 2015). It
80
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has been recognized that physical stores are key for
supporting an eGrocery channel. A hybrid business
model using physical stores as well as warehouses
to support fulfillment has been adopted to bolster
both online and offline services. Presently
Albertsons, ShopRite, Loblaws, Stop & Shop, and
Sedano’s use this model (Dudlicek, 2020).
Hy-Vee’s eGrocery concept involved fulfilling
orders at its four fulfillment centers but found that it
was unable to match the service levels afforded by
personalized shoppers and same-day pickup at the
store. It shifted to fulfillment at its retail locations as
well as partnering with Instacart and Shipt for
grocery delivery.
Amazon entered into the grocery business in 2007
with Amazon Fresh, a grocery delivery company
where consumers shop online and receive same day
or next morning delivery service (Page, 2019). In
2016 the company introduced its first physical
bricks-and-mortar retail store ‘Amazon Go’ that
uses technologies such as computer vision, deep
machine learning, and sensor fusion without cashier
operators, and with minimal human interaction
(Cheng, 2019). The ‘Grab-and-go’ shopping
concept uses an electronic recipient application to

register, check out, and charge the product while the
customers leave the store (Johnston, 2018). The
strategy used in Amazon Go stores is an innovation
from the self-checkout version concept that many
retailers use in brick-and-mortar stores today
(Polacco and Backes, 2018).
BUSINESS MODELS
Although food retailers are struggling to meet
demand for home delivery in the COVID-19 crisis
(Ryan, 2020), there are two business models that
are being used for current eGrocery operations.
1. Store pickup. Customers order online and pick
up at the store usually for free or a very low cost.
This model is preferred over in-store shopping
among young, busy, and affluent professionals, with
children (Thakker, 2019). As COVID-19
restrictions started to be imposed, grocery retailers
experienced significantly reduced in-store foot traffic
and turned to the curbside business model while
accommodating social distancing practices (Melton,
2020).
2. Home Delivery. Customers order online and
items are picked at the store and delivered to
customer homes, usually for an annual subscription.
Walmart offers an annual subscription of $98 or

$12.95 per month or $7.95 per same-day delivery
with unlimited numbers of orders per customer
(Dumont, 2019). Walmart installs a smart lock or
smart garage door opener on the home, which gives
the Walmart delivery employee a one-time entry
code. Each employee also wears a video camera
that records the delivery, and the footage can be
viewed live or later the customer’s smartphone. The
app notifies customers when the employee arrives
and leaves (Lore, 2019). Similarly, Amazon offers
unlimited online grocery which delivers from its
brick-and-mortar stores (Disis, 2017; Monica,
2017).
IMPROVING FULFILLMENT
A successful fulfillment strategy relies on giving
customers what, when, and how they want it at the
lowest possible cost (Ricker and Kalakota, 1999).
However, this is not always possible given the
nature of the market. When the eGrocery boom
began in 2015, SKUs at average warehouse or
fulfillment centers increased by 18.5 percent. The
increased demand on pick, packing and shipping
operations left many operations short-handed as
they aimed to fulfill orders at a faster rate. To reduce
costs, increase efficiency, and keep profitable
margins online retailers need to control “picking”
costs. In 2018 food retailers incurred a $5 to $15
Vol. 30 No. 2
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loss on every manually picked order and losses will
be higher as online orders increase (Ladd, 2019).
The picking in-store “bricks-and-mortar” shoppers
experienced congested aisles competing with store
workers serving as “personal shoppers,” other
customers, and third parties’ services personnel
(Meyersohn, 2019).

order to become economically profitable. But backof-store-automated robotic systems are capable of
collecting 800 products an hour, and bagging them
for home delivery or pick up at store by customers,
filling orders 10 times faster and more accurately
than store workers (Nassauer, 2020).
MANAGING THE LAST MILE

Table 10 offers an inventory of the current capability
and pre-COVID-19 projections of fulfillment
capability by 2028.
Some eGrocers are implementing robotic fulfillment
technology to reduce labor, and increase speed and
efficiency of fulfillment, while releasing pressure on
store inventory (Cosgrove, 2019; Wells, 2019). For
example, Albertsons has built automated miniwarehouses inside their stores and opened up “dark
stores” - locations that look like supermarkets but
are closed to customers - to make deliveries and
prepare pickup orders. As a customer enters their
order using Albertsons’ e-commerce interface, the
order is delivered to the automated system which
handles the fulfillment process. AI-enabled robots
and a system of totes and conveyors collect items
for online grocer orders in minutes (Moralez, 2019).
Whole Foods followed suit in 2020 as part of its
response to meeting the increased demand
stemming from COVID-19 (Tyko, 2020).
Execution of the Micro Fulfillment Centers (MFCs)
is complex and it still requires a high volume of
82
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Companies need to optimize not only internal
fulfilment processes but also the transportation costs
for the last-mile delivery. Last-mile distribution
accounts for 25% to 50% of transportation total
supply chain costs (Stiffler, 2020). For retailers in
the food and grocery segment, a smooth and
satisfactory delivery to the customer is more
significant than ever. Meeting demand and servicelevel expectations impacts profitability as consumers
expect faster, more frequent and often-times free
delivery.
The development of “Buy Online, Pick Up in
Store,” also known as BOPUS, has been one of the
key drivers in the growth of the eGrocery channel.
As shown in Table 11 and Table 12 the number of
retail locations offering BOPUS nearly doubled in
2018 among U.S. grocery retailers including
Walmart, Kroger and Target, increasing the
collective number of click-and-collect locations
from 2,451 to 5,800 (Koch, 2019).

While the BOPUS concept continues to grow and
catch hold, Table 13 and Table 14 suggest
customers still prefer to have their orders delivered
to their home. BOPUS is still not the preferred
means for the customer to receive their order.
Cost of delivery continues to vary from provider to
provider. Table 15 offers an example of the
expenses incurred by the customer for eGrocery
delivery options in 2020.
THE FORCED DISRUPTION OF COVID-19
HAS HELPED SERVE AS A CATALYST FOR
ACCEPTANCE
On January 20, 2020 the first confirmed case of
COVID-19 in the United States was reported at the
Providence Regional Medical Center in Edmonds,

Washington (Holshue, et al., 2020). While the
COVID-19 impact on eGrocery is yet to be
completely measured, the forced disruption caused
by self-quarantine, social distancing guidelines, and
travel restrictions have served as a catalyst for many
consumers to try using eGrocery channels. This may
result in a significant boost to help increase
acceptance of eGrocery channel options (Back,
2020).
Table 16 suggests older consumers were more likely
to embrace social distancing requirements during the
COVID-19 crisis. More than 8 in 10 (85.6%)
respondents ages 60 and older in February, 2020
indicated they were likely to avoid shopping centers
and malls. That is not surprising given that COVID19 hits older people the hardest, but it may have
had an unintended consequence on their shopping
habits. Since older individuals are the ones for
Vol. 30 No. 2
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whom the virus has been most fatal, they may be
especially likely to alter their behavior. This could
mean increased adoption of ecommerce, an area
where they have been laggards (Enberg, 2020).
To further support the argument that COVID-19
would increase the number of consumers
considering eGrocery channels we need only to
look at China where there was a significant increase
in the number of downloads of eGrocery apps as
COVID-19 infections worsened. Figure 1 uses the
84
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number of eGrocery application downloads on
January16 as a base. As the number of known
cases grew after the first known infection in the
United States on January 20, downloads increased
by as much as 585% of the January 16 base
(Wernau, 2020).
In China and South Korea, where there were the
earliest confirmed cases of coronavirus on
December 31, 2019 (Taylor, 2020), consumers
increased their reliance on e-commerce. Food

delivery spending in China shot up 20% in January
while some South Korean grocers saw triple-digit
online sales increases. Similarly following suit in
February, 2020 21% of U.S. shoppers bought
perishable groceries online, up from 18% during the
same period last year. Figure 2 reflects the major
demand increase in Chicago where online grocery
orders spiked two to three days after major news
announcements involving COVID-19 (Wells,
2020a).
Some stores were quickly overwhelmed by the
COVID-19 surge in demand. Grocers shifted

workers into e-commerce fulfillment roles as ninety
percent of their business shifted to online because
nobody was leaving their home. Stores that
previously had one or two workers picking and
packing online orders changed to as many as 20
doing those jobs (Wells, 2020b).
In March, the RetailX Coronavirus Consumer
Confidence Tracker (RetailX, 2020) reported
14.2% of U.K. internet users ages 18 and older
increased their online grocery shopping as shown in
Table 17. The U.K.’s leading online-only
supermarket Ocado saw its website and app crash
multiple times on March 13. Some customers who
Vol. 30 No. 2
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managed to place orders found that they could not
book a delivery sooner than a week away. Several
days later, the firm temporarily suspended access to
Ocado.com and refused all new orders to
concentrate on work behind the scenes. A March
19 statement confirmed that the grocer was “fully
booked and at full capacity and would be delivering
to over 170,000 households in the next four days.”

As of March 20, Ocado site visitors were greeted
with an update: “The website is currently only
available for customers with a delivery booked for
this Saturday and Sunday.”
the United States Instacart developed a new “Leave
at My Door Delivery” service offering the option to
have groceries left at the customer doorstep at a
Vol. 30 No. 2
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designated time instead of being hand-delivered.
The new service had been in the testing phase but
was rolled out to all customers. At the same time,
due to COVID-19 isolation, the company sales
jumped by a factor of ten times and in some places
such as California and Washington by a factor of
twenty times (Sampath, 2020).
The disruption caused by COVID-19 boosting
demand quickly exposed flaws or gaps in the
eGrocery channels. How the industry addressed
and corrected these flaws has helped make the
88
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eGrocery channels stronger and increase
acceptance.
HOW COVID-19 HAS IMPACTED
eGROCERY USE
As we continue to be impacted by the on-going
COVID-19 infections we are starting to see
changes in consumer behaviors and the use of the
eGrocery channels. Table 17 offers early insight in
March in the U.K. reflecting an increase in the use
of digital shopping for groceries. By May 2020,

surveys of U.K. shoppers shown in Table 18
reported changes in purchasing habits across all
ages. It is notable that while the older respondents
were less likely to change, approximately one-third
indicated they would shop more digitally.
Table 19 offers a longitudinal perspective of the
changes in the use of eGrocery channels before
COVID-19 in August, 2019 and during the summer
months as COVID-19 infection continued to grow
(Kleckler, 2020). This reflects significant growth in
the use of eGrocery channels.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
The expected increase of eGrocery channel use
resulting from COVID-19 has led to the
development of new avenues and approaches to
reach a wider variety of customers such as
development of the ‘dark store’ concept.
On-going improvements have required investments
in logistics and online marketing. Makers of
consumer staples have found that they are in a race
to secure prominent online slots with eGrocery
retailers and must develop new forms of digital
advertising and promotion. The shift to online
shopping likely will increase price transparency and
competition across the board, pressuring margins
for the whole industry (Back, 2020).
One of the biggest challenges retailers faced, as
COVID-19 developed, was a surge in eGrocery
demand, and the need for syncing up their inventory
with online availability and demand. As eGrocery
grows this represents a critical hurdle which must be

overcome. Grocers traditionally had to keep close
track of how many SKUs of toilet paper, for
example, they had coming into their warehouses or
store backrooms. But with the movement of
product onto shelves and into shoppers’ baskets
accelerating, at unprecedented speed, retailers
struggled to know what was available for online
fulfillment (Wells, 2019).
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS
There are a number of research questions for
academic researchers to investigate. For example:
• Why are eGrocery customers so loyal to their
provider?
• Does the “cost to change” influence consumer
decisions to change channels?
• Why does eGrocery acceptance differ by
country?
• How does eGrocery acceptance differ by age?
• How can eGrocery reach the older population
who are independent, live alone, and are not close
to family members, may not have smart phones and
are not computer savvy?
• How does eGrocery acceptance differ by gender?
• How does eGrocery acceptance differ by
economic standing?
• How does eGrocery acceptance differ by race?
• What are the key factors that increase the
likelihood of using an eGrocery channel?
• Which investments or improvement to the process
offer the greatest leverage to improve the eGrocery
channels?
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• How does the “last mile” differ from the “middle
mile” for eGrocery fulfillment?
• How does eGrocery channel pricing and
profitability differ from traditional grocery channels?
CONCLUSIONS
eGrocery channels have resurrected from the
failures of the early 2000’s as we have learned how
to effectively manage fulfillment and we continue to
innovate with last-mile issues to further drive down
cost. While the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
is yet to be completely known it is likely that it will
serve as a means to further boost customer’s
acceptance of eGrocery channels. eGrocery
channels are being stressed and tested under
conditions that will build, strengthen, and change
online business practices on the long term.
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